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OVERVIEW
The competition policy of the European Community does not concentrate on 
the “market power” of enterprises. Instead of that it uses the terms: “domination of the 
undertaking in the market” and “the abuse of the dominant position”. There is no doubt 
that such a position distorts free competition as it limits the freedom of activities of 
other market participants. Therefore, the art. 82 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (the EC Treaty) predicts that “any abuse by one or more undertakings of 
a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between 
Member States”.
Thus, the prohibition predicted in art. 82 of the EC Treaty is subject to three 
conditions: the domination of the undertaking in the market, the abuse of this dominant 
position and its affection on trade between Member States. The aim of the paper is 
to analyse them in details. However, they are not deﬁ  ne in the Treaty or Community 
legislation. The most important source of information on these conditions can be found 
in the decisions of the Commission and the judgements of the European Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance. As a result the main method used in preparing the paper 
is the analysis of the decisions and judgments and the formulation of general conclusions 
stemming from them.
It is expected that this analysis shows what is meant by “the relevant product and 
geographical market”, what are the indices of the dominant position and when we can talk 
about its abuse. The presentation of all these factors takes into account the circumstances 
of concrete cases. In other words, it is not abstract but  shows how the art. 82 is used in 
practice. 
Key words:  dominant position in the internal market, product and geographical market, 
market shares, barriers to market entry, super dominance, the abuse of the 
dominant position
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1. INTRODUCTION
In literature the art. 82 (previous art. 86) is treated as “the second of the twin pillars 
of the competition policy established under the EC Treaty” (e.g. Goyder, 1993: 339; 
Weatherill, 1996: 395). Its objective is to eliminate all forms of competition distortions 
made by a dominant ﬁ  rm which abuses its position. Thus, it is primarily aimed at the 
control of the conduct of a single ﬁ  rm, while art. 81 of the EC Treaty primarily concerns 
anti competitive  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  of  the  associations  of 
undertakings and concerted practises. It can be seen that both provisions complement 
each other and therefore can be called twin pillars of the EC competition policy.
There is no doubt that dominant ﬁ  rms may act independently on the market – dictate the 
level of prices, the conditions of the supply of products etc. The existence of a dominant 
position can have positive economic advantages, for example enabling undertakings to 
pursue an adventurous research and development policy. This can even lead to keeping 
down the prices and improving the quality of their products (compare, Dashwood and 
Wyatt, 1993: 437). However, there is also another scenario – economically powerful ﬁ  rms 
may choose to charge high prices or refuse to supply products to customers. Therefore, 
their conduct must be controlled.
It should be underlined that in EC law the dominance alone is not prohibited. The 
European Court of Justice indicates that: “A ﬁ  nding that an undertaking has a dominant 
position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons 
for which it has such a position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not 
to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market” 
(Michelin, C 322/81). In other words dominant undertakings have to be careful about 
their behaviour and they cannot abuse their position.
According to the art. 82 “any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member 
States”. Therefore, in deciding whether any particular action falls within this provision, 
the most important conditions are:
1.  the existence of a dominant position (this position has to be evaluated in the 
connection with relevant market);
2.  the abuse of this position;
3.  the effect on trade between Member States.
If these conditions are fulﬁ  lled, then an undertaking is in breach of art. 82. It should be 
noticed that there is no opportunity for an exemption to be sought from the application of 
this provision (the situation differs from that which exist in the case of art. 81). However, 
it does not mean that there is no scope for ﬂ  exibility in the application of art. 82    the 
concept of abuse is a ﬂ  exible one and will usually be determined after careful analysis 
of each situation (compare Furse, 2002: 189). Therefore, it is important to see how the 
Commission and European courts (the European Court of Justice and the Court of First 
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Instance) evaluate particular cases of dominance and its abuse. The cases will be presented 
under three main headings. Firstly, the problems connected with the dominant position will 
be discussed – its deﬁ  nition, criteria, the existence on the relevant market. Secondly, the 
question of the abuse and its examples will be presented. Finally, effect on trade between 
Member States will be considered.      
2. DOMINANT POSITION
2.1. Concept
The dominant position is not deﬁ  ned in the Treaty. However, the European Court of 
Justice clariﬁ  ed the meaning of this concept. It held that: “the dominant position relates 
to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately 
of its consumers. In general, a dominant position derives from a combination of several 
factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative” (United Brands, C 
27/76). This means that the Court attaches the concept of dominance with the economic 
power of the undertaking, in particular its ability to act on the market in an independent 
way.
The undertaking takes the dominant position on the market if it controls a considerable 
part of this market. However, it does not mean that the possibility to compete has to be 
eliminated. In Hoffman la Roche (C 85/76) the European Court of Justice stated that the 
dominant position “does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is 
a monopoly or quasi monopoly, but enables the undertaking which proﬁ  ts by it, if not 
determine, at least to have an appreciable inﬂ  uence on the conditions under which that 
competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it”.
It  can  be  seen  that  the  concept  of  the  dominant  position  is  based  mainly  on  the 
independence  of  the  undertaking  on  a  particular  market.  Therefore,  the  process  of 
determining the existence of a dominant position in a particular case normally should 
comprise  two  stages:  the  deﬁ  nition  of  relevant  market  (product,  geographical  and 
temporal) and the assessment of the strength of the undertaking in question on that market 
(see Dashwood and Wyatt, 1993: 441).     
 
2.2. The relevant product market
The analysis of the Commission decisions and judgements of the European courts 
leads to the conclusion that generally it is in the interest of a defendant undertaking to 
describe the product market as broadly as possible and for the Commission to deﬁ  ne it 
narrowly. Since the more narrowly the market is deﬁ  ned, the greater the market share of 
any undertaking will be (Furse, 2002: 191).
The European Court of Justice has described the relevant product market in many 
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cases. It underlines that „the deﬁ  nition of the relevant market is of essential signiﬁ  cance, 
for the possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to those characteristics 
of the products in question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt to satisfy 
an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent interchangeable with other products” 
(Continental Can Company, C 6/72). Thus, products have to be so characteristic that it is 
possible to tell them apart from other products.
Moreover,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  states  that  “the  concept  of  the  relevant 
market in fact implies that there can be effective competition between the products which 
form part of it and this presupposes that there is a sufﬁ  cient degree of interchangeability 
between all the products forming part of the same market in so far as a speciﬁ  c use of such 
products is concerned” (Hoffmann La Roche, C 85/76). Thus, the most important factor in 
deﬁ  ning the relevant product market is that of substitutability. This can be analysed from 
the perspective of both consumers and suppliers but it seems that the Court concentrates 
more on buyers’ needs.       
It also adds that “an examination limited only to the objective characteristics of the 
relevant products cannot be sufﬁ  cient: the competitive conditions and the structure of 
supply and demand on the market must also be taken into consideration” (Michelin, C 
322/81). This means that many factors have to be evaluated in order to deﬁ  ne the product 
market. 
Goyder (1993: 347) tries to list other relevant elements in this ﬁ  eld. On the one hand, 
the  attitudes  of  buyers  to  any  closely  matching  substitutes,  their  technical  qualities, 
composition and price range should be considered. On the other, the existence of barriers 
to entry to the market and the ability of undertakings to switch production from one type 
of goods to another without substantial capital expenditure or delay should be taken into 
account.   
It can be seen that it is not easy to state if a product forms the relevant product market. 
Therefore, the analysis of this question remains a central issue in the majority of cases 
under art. 82. Some examples of the European Court of Justice’s reasoning is presented 
below.
United  Brands  (C 27/76)  was  one  of  the  ﬁ  rst  cases  in  which  the  Court  used  the 
substitutability test. It concerned the supply of bananas to some of the Member States. 
According to the Commission, the product market consisted of bananas of all varieties, 
whether branded or unbranded but United Brands company argued that bananas formed 
part of the general market for fresh fruit. The Court considered many factors inter alia 
“seasonal  substitutability  in  general  between  banana  and  all  the  seasonal  fruit”  and 
characteristics of bananas. It concluded that “a very large number of consumers having a 
constant need for bananas are not noticeably or even appreciably enticed away from the 
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consumption of the product by the arrival of other fresh fruit (...) consequently the banana 
market is a market which is sufﬁ  ciently distinct from the other fresh fruit markets”.
The similar ruling was given in the case of Michelin (322/81). Here, the applicant 
claimed that the deﬁ  nition of the relevant market on which Commission based its decision 
was too wide, inasmuch as in the eyes of the consumer different types and sizes of tyres for 
heavy vehicles are not interchangeable and at the same time too narrow inasmuch as car 
and van tyres are excluded from it although they occupy similar positions on the market. 
The Court, however, did not accept these arguments. It stated that “as far as replacement 
tyres are concerned the ﬁ  rst point which must be made is that at the user level there is no 
interchangeability between car and van tyres on the one hand and heavy vehicle tyres on 
the other”. Thus, only tyres for heavy vehicles formed the relevant product market. 
However, there are also examples of cases in which the Court disagreed with the opinion 
of the Commission on the relevant product market. One of such cases was Continental 
Can (C 6/72) where the Court stated that: „in order to be regarded as constituting a distinct 
market, the products in questions must be individualised, not only by the mere fact that 
they are used for packaging certain products, but by particular characteristics of production 
which make them speciﬁ  cally suitable for this purpose”. As a result “a dominant position 
on the market for light metal containers for meat and ﬁ  sh cannot be decisive, as long as 
it has not been proved that competitors from other sectors of the market for light metal 
containers are not in a position to enter this market by a simple adaptation”.
  
 2.3. The relevant geographic market
The determination of the relevant geographic market is important in two aspects. 
First, this criterion is implicitly mentioned in art. 82 of the EC Treaty – there must be an 
abuse of a dominant position “within the common market or in a substantial part of it”. 
Secondly, the geographic deﬁ  nition of the market shows how many other competitors 
must be taken into account and this affects the assessment of the economic power wielded 
by the undertaking concerned. In general, the more extensive the market, the more diluted 
is the undertaking’s economic power and the less likely it is that it will be found to be 
dominant (Bridge and Lasok, 1994: 630).
There is no doubt that in determining the relevant geographic market one should take 
into account the economic importance of the area rather than its size. This was underlined 
by the European Court of Justice in the case of Sugar (joined cases 40 48, 50, 54 56, 111, 
113, 114/73): “for the purpose of determining whether a speciﬁ  c territory is large enough 
to amount to a substantial part of the common market within the meaning of art. 82 the 
pattern and volume of the production and consumption of the said product as well as the 
habits and economic opportunities of vendors and purchasers must be considered”. It 
can be seen that in deﬁ  ning a relevant market for the purpose of art. 82 of the EC Treaty 
it is necessary to identify the speciﬁ  c territory within which the interplay of supply and 
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demand is to be considered (Dashwood and Wyatt, 1993: 446).
The European Court of Justice also takes into account the conditions of competition 
on the market. As a result the dominant position should be referred to “a clearly deﬁ  ned 
geographic area in which the product is marketed and where the conditions of competition 
are sufﬁ  ciently homogeneous for the effect of the economic power of the undertaking to 
be able to be evaluated” (United Brands, C 27/76). 
The Court of the First Instance presents the same attitude. In the case Tetra Pak II 
(T 83/91) it stated that “the deﬁ  nition of the geographic market accordingly calls for an 
economic assessment; that market can thus be deﬁ  ned as the territory in which all traders 
operate in the same or sufﬁ  ciently homogeneous conditions of competition in so far as 
concerns speciﬁ  cally the relevant products, without being necessary for those conditions 
to be perfectly homogeneous”.
Thus, the relevant geographic market can consist of several Member States, only one 
of them or even a substantial part or region in a Member State. This was conﬁ  rmed by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice e.g. in United Brands (C 27/76) the Court 
agreed with the opinion of the Commission that six Member States (Federal Republic of 
Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) amounted to a 
substantial part of the common market. In Michelin (C 322/81) the relevant geographic 
market was conﬁ  ned to the Netherlands since the Commission decision concerned only a 
Dutch subsidiary of Michelin. Similarly, in British Airways (T 219/99) the Commission 
took the view that the relevant market was the United Kingdom market for air travel 
agency services and the Court of the First Instance agreed with that opinion. There were 
also such cases in which a part of the Member States amounted to the relevant geographic 
market e.g. in Sugar (joined cases 40 48, 50, 54 56, 111, 113, 114/73) the European Court 
of Justice accepted southern Germany as such an area.
2.4. The relevant time period
Markets change over time (particularly in terms of technological innovation) and 
market power must be sustained in the face of such possible changes over a considerable 
period of time for a position of dominance to be established under art. 82 (Tillotson, 1996: 
353).
However, the European courts very rarely treat this criterion as a decisive one. One of 
the examples is the case of Benzine Petroleum (C 77/77), where the European Court of 
Justice took into account the oil crisis and general shortage of petroleum products in the 
period 1973 74. It stated that “the application to the Netherlands Companies (Aardolie 
Belagen Gemeenschap BV) by Benzine Petroleum a rate of reduction identical or very 
close to that applied to its traditional customers would have resulted in a considerable 
diminution of the deliveries which those customers expected”. As a result the Court 
held that Benzine Petroleum did not abuse the dominant position in relation to AGB and 
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annulled the decision of the Commission.
Generally the Commission’s determination of the temporal constraints over which the 
relevant market is deﬁ  ned is not likely to be successfully challenged, though there may be 
arguments as to the duration of the alleged abuse (Furse, 2002: 198).       
2.5. The strength of the dominant undertaking  - the main criteria of dominance
There are many factors which should be taken into account in order to conclude that 
a dominant position exist on a given market. Most of them refer to the structure of the 
market. The conduct of an undertaking can also be treated as an indicative of dominance. 
However, the European Court of Justice does not accept that size and turnover alone could 
be such indicative (Goyder, 1993:341).
The most important criterion of dominance is the undertaking’s share in the relevant 
market.  The role of market share was underlined by the European Court of Justice e.g. 
in the case of Hoffman la Roche (C 85/76, § 41): “although the importance of the market 
shares may vary from one market to another the view may legitimately taken that very 
large shares are in themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position”. Generally the European courts’ approach appears to be 
that a market share of 70 per cent and above will certainly constitute a dominant position; 
a share of 50 70 per cent will raise a presumption of dominance; a share of 40 50 per 
cent may support a conclusion of dominance; and a share below 40 per cent in unlikely to 
permit the ﬁ  nding of dominance unless other evidence is overwhelming (compare Furse, 
2002: 202). However, the Commission in its 10th Report on Competition Policy suggested 
that an undertaking could still be found to enjoy a dominant position with a market share 
as low as 20 per cent.
Another important criterion is connected with the position of competitors. It may 
be helpful to compare market shares of the undertaking deemed to be in the dominant 
position with market shares of its competitors. Undertakings with relatively low market 
shares, 30 to 40 per cent, may still be in the dominant position if the rest of the market 
is highly fragmented, so that none of the other participants constitutes a serous threat to 
its independence (Dashwood and Wyatt, 1993: 452). Therefore, the European Court of 
Justice takes this criterion into account together with market shares of the undertaking. 
In the case of United Brands (C  27/76) it stated that UBC’s share of the relevant market 
(40 %  45%) did not automatically show that UBC controlled the market. According to 
the Court also the strength and number of its competitors should be considered. This 
comparison led the Court to the conclusion about UBC’s “preponderant strength” as its 
shares in the market were several times greater than that of Castle and Cooke which “is 
the best placed of all the competitors” (§ 111 and 112).  
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Financial and technical resources of an undertaking should also be taken into 
account. There is no doubt that a ﬁ  rm with large ﬁ  nancial and technical resources will be in 
a position to adapt its market strategy in order to meet and drive out competitors (Steiner, 
1994:  172).  Financial  strength  can  assist  the  undertaking  in  maintaining  dominance 
through large scale advertising of its product e.g. United Brand’s “Chiquita” banana. It 
can also allow the undertaking to remove a competitor and so increase its dominance by 
means of persistence price cutting, which the smaller ﬁ  rm cannot match (Tillotson, 1996: 
354). Financial resources also allow the undertaking to develop new technologies and as 
a result have a better position on the market. 
The next criterion of dominance is called vertical integration. It was considered and 
developed in the case of United Brands (C 27/76). The European Court of Justice noticed 
that “UBC was an undertaking vertically integrated to a high degree”. It owned large 
plantations, the bananas were carried from the place of production to the port of shipment 
by its own means of transport, including railways, it also owned refrigerated warehouses 
in  key  ports  throughout  Europe.  Moreover,  UBC  led  special  advertising  campaigns 
concerning “Chiquita” bananas. Thus, the vertical integration was evident at each of 
the stages: the production, packing, quality control, advertising and selling of bananas. 
According to the Court this allowed UBC to consolidate its economic strength.   
The possession of know-how and intellectual property can also be taken into account 
while determining a dominant position of an undertaking. This was considered as a relevant 
factor e.g. in the case of Hoffmann-La Roche (C 85/76). The European Court of Justice 
held that its “technical lead over competitors is due to the fact that it is the proprietor of 
several patents relating to vitamin A, even after the expiration of these patents, is a further 
indication that it occupies a dominant position” (§ 51). Similarly, in the case of Tetra Pak 
II (T 83/91) the Court of the First Instance noticed that this undertaking could protect 
its 90% share in aseptic packaging through its patent rights – “the documents before the 
Court indicate that Tetra Pak has patented the basic technology which it has developed in 
relation to machines, cartons and processes” (§ 10).     
Behaviour  of  the  undertaking  on  the  relevant  market  is  also  considered  as  an 
indicative of dominance e.g. in United Brands (C 27/76) the Commission noticed that this 
undertaking “enjoyed a degree of general independence in its behaviour on the relevant 
market which enabled it to hinder to a large extent any effective competition” (§ 59). 
However, behavioral evidence has only additional character. Thus, it should not normally 
be treated as sufﬁ  cient in itself to establish the existence of a dominant position (Dashwood 
and Wyatt, 1993: 454).
Barriers to entry into the market may hinder or prevent competition from arising 
and so reduce or eliminate its threat to the dominant ﬁ  rm ((Tillotson, 1996: 356). Thus, 
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apart from the examination of the present situation on the market the question of potential 
competition should be assessed. Why is it so important? Since an undertaking could have 
large market shares and yet not be able to reap signiﬁ  cant proﬁ  ts if it is constantly aware 
of the danger of potential competition (compare Furse, 2002: 203). However, it is not easy 
to examine the barriers to market entry as it requires a dynamic and long term view of the 
market structure. Moreover, many barriers have to be taken into account e.g. geographical, 
ﬁ  nancial, technical. They were examined in the case of United Brands (C 27/76) and the 
European Court of Justice stated that: “UBC’s economic strength has enabled it to adopt 
a ﬂ  exible overall strategy directed against new competitors establishing themselves on 
the whole of the relevant market”. According to the Court: “the particular barriers to 
competitors entering the market are the exceptionally large capital investments required for 
the creation and running of banana plantations, the need to increase the sources of supply 
in order to avoid effects of fruit diseases and bad weather, the introduction of an essential 
system of logistics which the distribution of a very perishable product makes necessary, 
economies of scale from which newcomers to the market cannot derive any immediate 
beneﬁ  t and the actual cost of entry made up inter alia of all the general expenses incurred 
in penetrating the market” (§ 122). This was a detailed analysis of barriers to entry into 
bananas market but usually the Commission and the European courts do not examine 
them in such a way. They just state that “barriers to entry are particularly high” or even do 
not take this criterion into account. Therefore, both the Commission and European courts 
are criticised for giving undue weight to such barriers and particularly for failing to take a 
long term view as to the prospects of market entry (Steiner, 1994: 173).         
  
2.6. Super-dominance
The  differences  in  market  power  of  the  ﬁ  rms  may  result  in  different  levels  of 
dominance.  Hence,  the  space  for  the  doctrine  of  super dominance  is  created,  which 
entails the assumption that the same behaviour is deemed to be more abusive the larger 
the dominance of the undertaking in question is (see Appeldoorn, 2005: 655). There is no 
doubt that “super dominant” undertakings have special responsibilities on the market. 
This was underlined in the opinion of the Advocate General Fennelly in the case of 
Compaignie Maritime Belge (Joined Cases 395 and 396/96 P): “Article 82 cannot be 
interpreted as permitting monopolists or quasi monopolists to exploit the very signiﬁ  cant 
market power which their super-dominance confers so as to preclude the emergence 
either of a new or additional competitor. Where an undertaking, or group of undertakings 
whose conduct must be assessed collectively, enjoys a position of such overwhelming 
dominance verging on monopoly, comparable to that which existed in the present case ... 
it would not be consonant with the particularly onerous special obligation affecting 
such a dominant undertaking not to impair further the structure of the feeble existing 
competition” (§ 137 of the opinion). However, the European Court of Justice did not 
use that phrase in its judgment though it condemned the behaviour of the undertaking in 
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question. 
It is obvious that super dominant ﬁ  rms have a greater impact on competition than 
regular dominant ﬁ  rms. However, there are some problems with the practical application 
of the concept of super dominance. They concern both the economic and legal aspects. It 
should be noticed that super dominant ﬁ  rms are left with less room to compete the larger 
they grow. They must refrain from competition, otherwise they risk being found guilty of 
contravening art. 82 of the EC Treaty (Appeldoorn, 2005: 656). Another problem is that 
the assessment of super dominance is based rather on the size of the undertaking than 
on its behaviour which is incompatible with the basic attitude of the European Court of 
Justice. Finally, the art. 82 is infringed only if an undertaking abuses its dominant position. 
This means that even if it enjoys super dominance of the market, this factor alone cannot 
make it fall foul of art. 82 (Appeldoorn, 2005: 656). 
All of these problems will have to be considered by the Court of the First Instance while 
judging the case Microsoft (T 201/04, pending case). The Commission in its decision 
took into account that this undertaking takes “an overwhelming dominant position” and 
imposed a ﬁ  ne on it and an obligation to disclose portions of technical information to its 
competitors.  
3. THE ABUSE OF THE DOMINANT POSITION
3.1. Concept
Art. 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the abuse of the dominant position but its deﬁ  nition 
is not given in this provision. It only predicts that “such abuse may, in particular, consist 
in:
a.  directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions;
b.  limiting  production,  markets  or  technical  development  to  the  prejudice  of 
consumers;
c.  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
d.  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts”.
Thus, the art. 82 gives the examples of abusive practices. Decisions of the  
Commission and judgments of European courts conﬁ  rm that there are many other 
practices which can have such a character. The range of cases decided under this 
article shows that the concept of abuse is wide, capable of covering variety of 
policies and actions that depart form normal competitive and commercial practice   
(Goyder, 1993: 350).
The European Court of Justice underlines that “the abuse is an objective concept relating 
to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to inﬂ  uence the 
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structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, 
the degree of competition is weakened and which, by recourse to methods different from 
those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the 
transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition” (see 
Hoffman  La Roche where this statement was made for the ﬁ  rst time). It can be seen that 
this is a broad concept which covers many different practices. The main types of abusive 
conduct are presented below but this is not a comprehensive list.
3.1. Examples
3.1.1. Pricing policies
Price competition is one of the most visible on the market. Generally, undertakings can 
be attacked for too high prices, which are a matter of exploiting a position of strength, 
for too low prices, termed ‘predatory pricing’ and for setting different prices for different 
customers (Furse, 2002: 238). Therefore, these main kinds of pricing policies will be 
discussed.
Excessively high price is deﬁ  ned by the European Court of Justice as the one which 
bears no reasonable relation to “the economic value of the product” (General Motors 
Continental, C 26/75). Prices charged by General Motors for its exclusive inspection 
service  for  second hand  Opel  cars  were  found  excessive.  However,  the  undertaking 
showed that “it very quickly reduced the charge for the inspection ... and refunded the 
excess to the parties concerned” (§ 19). Therefore, the European Court of Justice did no 
treat General Motor’s conduct as the abuse of the dominant position. 
The question of excessively high prices was also considered in the case of British 
Leyland plc (C 226/84). The Court conﬁ  rmed that “an undertaking abuses its dominant 
position where it has an administrative monopoly and charges for its services fees which 
are disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided” (§ 27). British Leyland 
charge excessive fees for the approval certiﬁ  cates for left hand drive cars and therefore 
abused its dominant position.
Predatory pricing is used by undertakings in order to drive out potential competitors 
out of the market   the prices of goods and services are reduced, if necessary below cost. 
Thus “the purpose of the dominant ﬁ  rm’s price cutting is to preserve its long run monopoly 
by frightening off potentially serious competition. The dominant ﬁ  rm is therefore quite 
willing to accept losses in that particular market for the time being – losses which can 
absorb since it is earning high proﬁ  ts in other markets” (Hay and Morris, 1991: 580). At 
the beginning consumers beneﬁ  t from low prices but afterwards they become dependent 
on the dominant ﬁ  rm which can dictate the price conditions after capturing a larger share 
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of the market. 
The question of predatory prices was considered in the case of AKZO Chemie (C 62/86). 
The European Court of Justice underlined that: “prices below average variable costs (that 
is to say, those which vary depending on the quantities produced) by means of which a 
dominant undertaking seeks to eliminate a competitor must be regarded as abusive. A 
dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating 
competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking advantage of 
its monopolistic position”. However, “prices below average total costs (ﬁ  xed costs plus 
variable costs), but above average variable costs, must be regarded as abusive if they are 
determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor”. Those criteria were used in the 
case and the Court stated that AKZO Chemie abused its dominant position. This approach 
to predation can be presented in the following way:
Price below average variable costs       Abusive conduct can be assumed
Price above average variable costs       Abusive conduct can be assumed    
      but below average total costs  but it is necessary to establish if it
                                                                                                     aims to the elimination of competition
      Price above average total costs  There is no abusive conduct   
Discriminatory prices    a dominant undertaking may fall foul of art. 82 by charging 
different  prices  in  respect  of  equivalent  transactions  without  objective  justiﬁ  cation 
(Dashwood and Wyatt 1993: 462). This case is predicted in art. 82 point c. 
The question of price discrimination was considered in the case of United Brands (C 
27/76). The Commission accused UB of charging each week for the sale of its branded 
bananas – without objective justiﬁ  cation – a selling price which differed appreciably 
according to the Member State where its customers were established. The European Court 
of Justice agreed that UB used discriminatory prices which placed certain distributors at 
a competitive disadvantage. Consequently, it stated that “the policy of differing prices 
enabling UBC to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties ...was an abuse of a dominant position (§ 234).
3.1.2. Abusive discounts or rebates
The normal function of a discount or a rebate is the encouragement of a customer to 
do business with a supplier on a regular basis (Goyder, 1993: 358). However, this kind 
of activities can be dangerous for free competition. Particular pressure can be exerted by 
‘loyalty (ﬁ  delity) discounts’ and ‘target discounts’. 
The ﬁ  rst ones are granted by a dominant supplier on condition that the customer enters 
into an obligation to purchase all or a very high percentage of his requirements from the 
dominant ﬁ  rm (Tillotson, 1996: 360). Thus, the discount is given for the purchasing of 
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certain products exclusively from one undertaking. 
In the case of target discounts the price reduction is conditional on the purchasing of 
an agreed quantity of products from the supplier during the reference period (Dashwood 
and Wyatt, 1993: 464).
Both kinds of discounts were the subject of the judgments of the European courts. In 
Hoffmann-La Roche (C 85/76) the European Court of Justice underlined that “the ﬁ  delity 
rebate is designed through the grant of a ﬁ  nancial advantage to prevent customers from 
obtaining their supplies from competing producers; furthermore the effect of ﬁ  delity rebates 
is to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading partners in 
that two purchasers pay a different price for the same quantity of the same product” (§ 
90). Thus, according to the Court they fell within art. 82 point c and an undertaking which 
applies a system of ﬁ  delity rebates abuses its dominant position.
The same can be said about target discounts which were considered in the case of 
Michelin (C 322/81). The Court stated that “it is an abuse of a dominant position within 
the meaning of art. 82 for an undertaking to bind dealers to it by means of a system 
under which discounts are granted according to the quantities sold during a relatively 
long reference period with the result that the pressure increases on the buyer to reach 
the purchase ﬁ  gure needed to obtain the discount”. It also added that the target discount 
in question limited the dealer’s choice of supplier and made access to the market more 
difﬁ  cult for competitors.
It is now well established that rebate or discount schemes are acceptable only if they are 
non discriminatory and therefore do not fall within art. 82 point c. This can be illustrated 
e.g. by the case of Irish Sugar (T 228/97) where the Court of the First Instance conﬁ  rmed 
that “ﬁ  delity rebates granted by an undertaking in a dominant position are an abuse within 
the meaning of article 82 where their aim is, by granting ﬁ  nancial advantages, to prevent 
customers from obtaining their supplies from competing producers”. In this situation 
several factors should be taken into account: “whether there is a tendency, through an 
advantage not justiﬁ  ed by any economic service, to remove or restrict the buyer’s choice 
as to his sources of supply, to block competitors’ access to the market, to apply dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties or to reinforce the dominant 
position by distorting competition” (§ 197).
 
3.1.3. Tie-in-sales
The provision of article 82 (d) covers all kinds of tying arrangements (“making the 
conclusion  of  contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by  the  other  parties  of  supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts”). Tie in sales entail situations in which the purchaser 
will be supplied with one product only if another is also purchased. In its extreme position, 
Justyna Maliszewska-Nienartowicz442
where tie in sales extend across the complete range of the dominant supplier, such a 
practice may be termed full line forcing (Furse, 2002: 209).
There is no doubt that this practice distorts competition. Thus, in the case of Hilti 
(T 30/89) the Court of the First Instance underlined that “it is an abuse of a dominant 
position for an undertaking to refuse to supply certain products separately, to put pressure 
on independent distributors to cause them to adopt its discriminatory practices and to 
refuse to honour the guarantee attaching to tools sold by it where they have been used with 
consumables produced by other manufacturers”. As a result it conﬁ  rmed the position of 
the Commission that Hilti, which required users of its patented nail cartridges to buy nails 
from it as well, infringed art. 82 of the EC Treaty.
Similarly, in the case of Tetra Pak II  (T 83/91) the Court of the First Instance noticed 
that: “where an undertaking in a dominant position directly or indirectly ties its customers 
by an exclusive supply obligation, that constitutes an abuse since it deprives the customer 
of the ability to choose his source of supply and denies other manufacturers access to the 
market”. 
3.2.4. The abusive use of intellectual property rights
The general position in competition law is that property rights cannot be asserted 
in such a way as to lead to an anti competitive outcome (Furse, 2002: 214). However, 
sometimes undertakings use their intellectual property rights e.g. patent rights in such a 
way that they act as a barrier to market entry for new competitors and in this way they 
consolidate the strength of a dominant position.
This issue was considered in the case of Tetra Pak I  (T 51/89). Tetra Pack acquired a 
group which held an exclusive patent licence for new and important technology relating 
to the sterilisation of milk cartons. This was held by the Commission to be an abuse of its 
dominant position in the market for liquid food packaging. The Court of the First Instance 
agreed with this opinion. It stated that although an exclusive patent licence was not per se 
an abuse, the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of it in this case had “the effect of 
strengthening the undertakings’ s already very considerable dominance of a market where 
very little competition was found and of preventing, or at least considerably delaying, the 
entry of a new competitor into that market”. Thus, barriers to entry into the market were 
taken into account
However, the leading case in the ﬁ  eld of abusive use of intellectual property rights 
was that of Magill (Joined cases C 241 and 242/91 P). Here the Commission found that 
broadcasters in Ireland abused their dominant position by refusing to grant licences for 
the publication of their respective weekly listings and thus exploiting the copyright they 
held in television programme listings. The European Court of Justice conﬁ  rmed that 
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mere ownership of an intellectual property right could not confer a dominant position 
but “by force of circumstances appellants (RTE and ITP), enjoyed, along with the BBC, 
a de facto monopoly over the information used to compile listings for the television 
programmes ... thus they were in a position to prevent effective competition on the market 
in weekly television magazines” (§ 47). Therefore, it stated that “the appellants’ refusal to 
provide basic information by relying on national copyright provisions thus prevented the 
appearance of a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, 
which the appellants did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand. 
Such refusal constituted an abuse under heading (b) of the second paragraph of Article 82 
of the Treaty” (§ 54).
It can be noticed that according to the Commission and European courts the exercise 
of  an  exclusive  right  by  the  proprietor  may  involve  abusive  conduct.  However,  the 
determination of an abuse is not automatic but depends on the circumstances of the case. 
5.5.5.  Refusal to deal or supply and the “essential facilities” doctrine
A dominant undertaking’s refusal to supply goods or services in the ordinary course of 
business or a refusal to supply except on very unreasonable terms may constitute a breach 
of article 82 (Tillotson, 1996: 361). The European Court of Justice underlines that such 
conduct can fall within the conditions of art. 82 points b and c, involving the limitation of 
markets to the prejudice of consumers and discrimination which might in the end eliminate 
a trading part from the relevant market (see United Brands, C 27/76, § 183).
The earliest case which concerned the question of refusal to deal was Commercial 
Solvents  Corporation  (Joined  cases  6  and  7/73).  Here  CSC  refused  to  supply  Zoja 
with amnibutanol required for the manufacture of the derivative, ethambutol. This was 
the result of CSC’s decision to manufacture and sell the derivative on its own. The 
Commission stated that this was the abuse of the dominant position and the European 
Court of Justice upheld its decision. It noticed that: ”an undertaking being in a dominant 
position as regards the production of raw material and therefore able to control the supply 
to manufactures of derivatives cannot just because it decides to start manufacturing these 
derivatives (in competition with its former customers) act in such a way as to eliminate 
their competition which in the case in question would amount to eliminating one of the 
principal manufacturers of ethambutol in the common market” (§ 25).
Similarly, in the case of United Brands, which was guilty of several abuses, the Court 
condemned its refusal to supply Olesen (a Danish distributor) with green bananas. It 
underlined that: “an undertaking in a dominant position for the purpose of marketing 
a product – which cashes in on the reputation of a brand name known to and valued by 
the consumers – cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular 
commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of ordinary”(§ 
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182).
Refusal to supply a service can be illustrated by the case of Télémarketing (C 311/84). 
Here the problem was that a subsidiary of Radio and television Luxembourg ceased to 
accept spot advertisements involving an invitation to make a telephone call for further 
information unless its telephone number was used (see Korah, 1996: 118). The Commission 
condemned this conduct and the European Court of Justice upheld its decision. It stated 
that: “an abuse within the meaning of art. 82 is committed where, without any objective 
necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves to 
itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which might 
be carried out by another undertaking” (§ 27). 
It is underlined that this case signalled a new approach by the Commission to a refusal 
to supply goods or services – it has begun to develop the “essential facilities” doctrine 
(Tillotson, 1996: 363). An “essential facility” is a facility or infrastructure without access 
to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers. The owner of an essential 
facility which uses its power in one market in order to protect or strengthen its position in 
another relating market, imposing a competitive disadvantage on its competitor, infringes 
art. 82. (compare Furse, 2002: 256).
The leading case which shows how this doctrine operates is now Bronner (C 7/97).   
Bronner was the publisher in Austria of a daily newspaper with a market share of 3,6%. It 
argued that it could not develop its own home delivery and that such delivery constituted 
“essential facility” to which it should have access (it wanted to use the delivery service of 
Mediaprint which was the publisher of papers with a market share of 46,8 %). However, 
the European Court of Justice, following the Advocate General’s opinion, held that there 
are other methods of distributing daily newspapers, such as by post and through sale in 
shops and at kiosks. “Moreover, it does not appear that there are any technical, legal or 
even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difﬁ  cult, 
for any other publisher of daily newspapers to establish, alone or in cooperation with other 
publishers, its own nationwide home delivery scheme and use it to distribute its own daily 
newspapers” (§ 44).
Thus, it the literature it is stressed that the key elements are that: 1) access to the facility 
must be genuinely indispensable; 2) it is not possible practically to replicate the facility; 3) 
even by an undertaking of the same size and resources as the holder of the facility (Furse, 
2002: 260). There is no doubt that it is not enough to show that without the facility the 
competitor would ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to compete.
6.  EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
This is the last condition of the application of art. 82 . It was described in detail 
in the case of Hugin Kassaregister (C  22/78). The Court of Justice underlined that “the 
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purpose of that condition is to deﬁ  ne, in the context of law governing competition, the 
boundary between the area respectively covered by Community law and the law of the 
Member States. Thus, Community law covers any agreement or any practice which is 
capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner 
which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between the Member 
States, in particular by partitioning the national markets or by affecting the structure of 
competition within the common market. On the other hand conduct the effects of which 
are conﬁ  ned to the territory of a single Member State is governed by the national legal 
order”.
In the case of Gesellschaft (C 7/82) the Court conﬁ  rmed that “in order to determine 
whether trade between Member States is capable of being affected by an abuse of a 
dominant position in the relevant market for the purpose of art. 82 of the Treaty, account 
must be taken of the consequences for the effective competitive structure in the common 
market”. Thus, the most important is the affection of the dominant undertaking’s conduct 
on the structure of competition within the common market, in particular it cannot partition 
national markets. It should also be noticed that it is not necessary to prove that the abusive 
conduct has in fact appreciably affected trade between Member States. It is sufﬁ  cient to 
show that it was capable of having that effect (Michelin, C 322/81).
In practice it not difﬁ  cult to establish that most transaction are capable of affecting trade 
between Member States. Therefore, only rarely this condition precluded the application 
of art. 82. One of such cases was the above mentioned Hugin Kassaregister (C 22/78) 
where the European Court of Justice held that its refusal to supply had no perceptible 
repercussions beyond the UK. Thus, Hugin did not breach the art. 82.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This short overview of selected judgments of the European courts shows their role in 
the application of EC competition rules. It must be underlined that the art. 82 (previous 
86) of the EC Treaty is general and does not deﬁ  ne the concepts to which it refers. Thus, 
it would be difﬁ  cult to apply it in practice without the explanation what is meant by the 
dominant position, its abuse and the effect on trade between Member States.  
The overview also conﬁ  rms that both the Commission in its decisions and the European 
courts in their judgments interpret art. 82 of the EC Treaty in a broad and at the same time 
elastic way. Thus, the dominant position “relates to the economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers” but the particular criteria 
of dominance can differ. Similarly, the list of abusive practices is an open one. As a result 
different kinds of conduct can be taken into account in the frames of art. 82. 
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This is a good solution as new practices connected with the technological development 
can be considered by the Commission and European courts. At the same time they have 
competence to develop new doctrines such as “super dominance” and “essential facility” 
doctrines. These concepts can be shaped in a new way by the European courts as the 
Microsoft decision, which deals with both of them, is being appealed now (T 201/04, 
pending case). Therefore, it is stressed that the application of art. 82 has arrived at a 
deﬁ  ning moment and the European courts have the opportunity to shape these doctrines 
for the years to come (Appeldoorn, 2005: 658).
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